The fear of crime refers to the fear of being a victim of crime being disproportionate to the likihood of being a victim of crime. Studies of the fear of crime occur in criminology. Moral panics are often the cause of the rising fear of crime.
Media coverage has been blamed for the current fear of crime. The complex nature of crime allows the media to exploit social naivety, coverage of crime is not only selective but is a distortion of the everyday world of crime.[1] The media contributes to the climate of fear that is created, the actual frequency of victimisation is only a tiny fraction of potential crime.[ 2 ] The media commonly reverts to simple spiritual interpetations of crime.
With crime accounting for up to 25 per cent[2] of news coverage, the quality and angle of the coverage becomes an issue. The media displays violent crime disproportionately, whilst neglecting minor crimes, The profile of offenders in the media is distorted causing misunderstanding of criminal offending.
It is still the case that information about crime is passed on over time and changes slightly during the process. This leads to an unreal perception of the problem of crime and can be responsible for fear of crime.
Elderly persons' fear of crime:
The elderly have a dominant role in ‘fear of crime’ research and societal understanding of the fear of crime. Once the dispassionate domain of academics and government researchers, the ‘fear of crime’ has become a currency of political competition and a cultural preoccupation.[3] Politicians and the media inflame the fear of crime, further victimising elderly victims and indeed all victims. Before the 60’s in a time before adequate crime victim surveys, it was assumed that the elderly were the category of people at the highest risk of victimisation. The myth of great elderly victimisation included elderly suffering greater financial and physical harm as a result of victimisation, a greater amount psychological trauma as a result of crime and the highest fear of crime in comparison to other members of the community. However with the publication of survey data results in the 1980’s, higher crime rates and more severe consequences for elders were no longer valid assumptions.[4] Although the evidence details the myths surrounding elderly victimisation, the elderly still have a fear of crime problem. Studies have continually found that persons over the age of 65 have the lowest victimisation rates of any age group, yet they have the greatest fear of crime, in addition the elderly are likely to encounter crime that is motivated by economic gain such as burglary and theft, and least likely to suffer violent crimes.
Sunday, 25 March 2007
Tuesday, 6 March 2007
Stanley Cohen and Moral Panics
http://www.aber.ac.uk/media/Students/hrb9701.html
>"If we do not take steps to preserve the purity of blood, the Jew will destroy civilisation by poisoning us all." (Hitler, 1938)
>"Surely if the human race is under threat, it is entirely reasonable to segregate AIDS victims, otherwise the whole of mankind could be engulfed." (The Daily Star, 2 December 1988)
>"If we do not take steps to preserve the purity of blood, the Jew will destroy civilisation by poisoning us all." (Hitler, 1938)
>"Surely if the human race is under threat, it is entirely reasonable to segregate AIDS victims, otherwise the whole of mankind could be engulfed." (The Daily Star, 2 December 1988)
>Although an extreme illustration, the above quotes serve to set up the creation of a 'moral panic'. Just as Hitler's 'facts' were unfounded, so too were The Daily Star and what resulted from both incidents was, in effect, the persecution of two minority groups within society. Hitler's quote stemmed from the use of propaganda, and although it would be fair to say that the essence of what is termed 'propaganda' does not exist in such a force today, it is nevertheless evident that what was quoted from The Daily Star is tantamount to propaganda. Throughout history, the mass media industry has been utilised as a tool to appeal to the public at large, particularly in the field of politics, where people in a position of power can tempt society into believing what they want them to believe. As Eldridge describes "The media, wittingly or unwittingly, reproduce the definitions of the powerful." [Eldridge 1997: 65] This document will examine not only the essence and origin of the term 'moral panic' but the very important nature of the media's involvement in the whole process of creating a 'moral panic'.
>It was Stanley Cohen, in his work, Folk Devils and Moral Panics. (1987) who first coined the term 'moral panics'. He defined the concept as a sporadic episode which, as it occurs, subjects society to bouts of moral panic, or in other terms, worry about the values and principles which society upholds which may be in jeopardy. He describes its characteristics as "a condition, episode, person or group of persons [who] become defined as a threat to societal values and interests." [Cohen, 1987: 9] Cohen goes on to discuss the way in which the mass media fashions these episodes, or stylises them, amplifying the nature of the facts and consequently turning them into a national issue, when the matter could have been contained on a local level.
>Cohen's study originated from his interest in the youth culture and its perceived potential threat to social order. Throughout each era, a group has emerged who 'fits' the criteria, such as the Teddy Boys, Mods and Rockers, Skinheads and Hells Angels. They all become associated with certain types of violence, which in turn also provoke public reaction and emotion, as topics in their own right. Such issues as football hooliganism, drug abuse, vandalism and political demonstrations, all struck a chord in public opinion, but the impact might not have been on such a large scale, were it not for the part the mass media play in the exposition of the facts.
>Cohen's study was primarily about the Mods and Rockers of the 1960's and the treatment they received in the public eye. The main criticism was that they were seen as a threat to law and order largely through the way the mass media represented them, in the form of what Cohen calls the 'control culture'. Largely this refers to the media sensationalising an event and then calling for a punishment to be set to persecute the offenders. As Eldridge notes "In the process and as part of the dramatic element, scapegoats and folk devils are located and are woven into the narrative." [Eldridge 1997: 61] In other terms society cannot accept responsibility for its own failures and so they look to find someone who can be incriminated.
>The 'amplification' which takes place through the media's work serves to appeal to the public so that they concur with ready-made opinions about the course of action to be taken, and these opinions have been found from the members of what Cohen refers to as the 'moral barricade', i.e. bishops, politicians and editors. Combined with the opinions of the 'experts' who are wheeled out to give their diagnosis, they reach an agreement about how to cope with the situation in hand, and the problem either disappears or at least deteriorates.
>There are various ways in which these 'panics' are dealt with. Sometimes they aren't novel topics; they're topics which have existed in society for a considerable time but a particular event has triggered the significance. Although generally they pass as quickly as they came and are long forgotten, there are occasions when the consequences and repercussions are so long lasting and so much in the public eye that they can affect legal and social policy or as Eldridge puts it, even the way society perceives itself.
"Mean World" Syndrome>Cultivation theory
The "Mean World" Syndrome is one of the main effects of the Cultivation Theory. This occurs when heavy viewers see the world as a much nastier place than do light viewers. This, theorists attribute to the fact that television depicts the world as a mean and violent place and therefore, heavy viewers are overly frightened and too cautious of the real world (Phillips). Gerbner believes this may have something to do with America's policy on capital punishment (Stossel).
"The Double Dose Effect"
-Proponents of the Cultivation Theory attempt to show how television cultivates a homogenous outlook on life, revealing a lack of diversity among heavy viewers. The idea is that heavy viewing, regardless of viewer demographic, creates an assumption in the viewer, that violence is more prevalent than it actually is. Gerbner and other theorists would argue that heavy viewers of violent television come to the assumption that violence is higher in the everyday world, and that one's exposure to this constant imagery blends with their everyday experiences reguardless of viewer demographic. This we refer to as the mainstreaming mechanism (Kenny).
-Another twist at the theory occurs when the viewers' everyday experiences parallel and are consistent with theose they view on television. Here, the cultivation effect is accelerated when viewers amplify their real-life experience by what the view on television. Theorists would argue that the crime "resonates" with them and that they are susceptible to a "double dose" effect where cultivation increases (Pierce). Thus, from this type of symbolic portrayal occuring on television, viewers tend to replay real-experiences over in their minds . In turn, real-life incidents will be reinforced by their viewing experience.
The "Mean World" Syndrome is one of the main effects of the Cultivation Theory. This occurs when heavy viewers see the world as a much nastier place than do light viewers. This, theorists attribute to the fact that television depicts the world as a mean and violent place and therefore, heavy viewers are overly frightened and too cautious of the real world (Phillips). Gerbner believes this may have something to do with America's policy on capital punishment (Stossel).
"The Double Dose Effect"
-Proponents of the Cultivation Theory attempt to show how television cultivates a homogenous outlook on life, revealing a lack of diversity among heavy viewers. The idea is that heavy viewing, regardless of viewer demographic, creates an assumption in the viewer, that violence is more prevalent than it actually is. Gerbner and other theorists would argue that heavy viewers of violent television come to the assumption that violence is higher in the everyday world, and that one's exposure to this constant imagery blends with their everyday experiences reguardless of viewer demographic. This we refer to as the mainstreaming mechanism (Kenny).
-Another twist at the theory occurs when the viewers' everyday experiences parallel and are consistent with theose they view on television. Here, the cultivation effect is accelerated when viewers amplify their real-life experience by what the view on television. Theorists would argue that the crime "resonates" with them and that they are susceptible to a "double dose" effect where cultivation increases (Pierce). Thus, from this type of symbolic portrayal occuring on television, viewers tend to replay real-experiences over in their minds . In turn, real-life incidents will be reinforced by their viewing experience.
Cultivation theory study
Another cultivation theorist, Leonard Eron, too attempts to prove the effects of television on viewers. By following a group of third graders in suburban New York, he learned that the more violent the tv watched, the more aggressive the children were in school. He returned again when they were nineteen and then again at age thirty. Both times, the previously troubled youngsters revealed problems in marriages and with the law (Phillips). In fact, in a 1993 conference of the National Council for Families and Television, Eron estimated that 10% of violence in the US can be directly attributed to viewing of television (Stossel).
Another cultivation theorist, Leonard Eron, too attempts to prove the effects of television on viewers. By following a group of third graders in suburban New York, he learned that the more violent the tv watched, the more aggressive the children were in school. He returned again when they were nineteen and then again at age thirty. Both times, the previously troubled youngsters revealed problems in marriages and with the law (Phillips). In fact, in a 1993 conference of the National Council for Families and Television, Eron estimated that 10% of violence in the US can be directly attributed to viewing of television (Stossel).
The Cultivation Theory http://www.colostate.edu/Depts/Speech/rccs/theory06.htm
George Gerbner"The television set has become a key member of the family, the one who tells most of the stories most of the time."
George Gerbner"The television set has become a key member of the family, the one who tells most of the stories most of the time."
-Gerbner's initial research on the Cultural Indicators Project in the early 1960's paved the way for an extended career of research implementing his cultivation analysis research method. Gerbner spent time at The Annenberg School of Communications at the University of Pennsylvania where he served as Dean while continuing his research on the social cultivation of television, emphasizing violence and its effects. He retired in 1989.
-The cultivation theory got its start with the cultivation hypothesis, created by George Gerbner, which states attempts to understand how "heavy exposure to cultural imagery will shape a viewer's concept of reality" (Pierce). Stemming directly from his work on the Cultural Indicators Research Project, Gerbner used the cultural analysis research strategy to cumulate his theory on television cultivation.
-Essentially, the theory states that heavy exposure to mass media, namely television, creates and cultivates attitudes more consistent with a media conjured version of reality than with what actual reality is. The cultivation theory asserts that heavy viewers' attitudes are cultivated primarily by what they watch on television. Gerbner views this television world as "not a window on or reflection of the world, but a world in itself" (McQuail 100). This created version of the world entices heavy viewers to make assumptions about violence, people, places, and other fictionalized events which do not hold true to real life events.
-Here, television acts as a socializing agent that educates viewers on a separate version of reality. The concrete base behind the cultivation theory states that viewers tend to have more faith in the television version of reality the more they watch television. We must realize that light viewing of television events tend not to shape an entirely separate reality. Thus, the focus of study is on heavy viewers. Light viewers may have more outlets and sources to influence their version of reality than heavy viewers whose main source of information serves to be the television programming.
Deviancy amplification spiral
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(Redirected from Deviancy Amplification Spiral)
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Deviancy amplification spiral is a media hype phenomenon defined by media critics as an increasing cycle of reporting on a category of antisocial behavior or other undesirable events. In 1972, Stanley Cohen wrote a book, Folk Devils and Moral Panics, whose thesis is that moral panics usually include what he called a deviancy amplification spiral.
According to theory, the spiral starts with some "deviant" act. Usually the deviance is criminal but it can also involve legal acts considered morally repugnant. The mass media report what they consider to be newsworthy, but the new focus on the issue uncovers hidden or borderline examples which themselves would not have been newsworthy except inasmuch as they confirm the "pattern". For a variety of reasons, what is not frightening and would help the public keep a rational perspective (such as statistics showing that the behavior or event is actually less common or harmful than generally believed) tends to be ignored.
As a result, minor problems begin to look serious and rare events begin to seem common. Members of the public are motivated to keep informed on these events. The resulting publicity has potential to increase deviant behaviour by glamourising it or making it seem common or acceptable.
In the next stage, supporters of the theory contend, public concern about crime typically forces the police and the whole law enforcement system to focus more resources on dealing with the specific deviancy than it warrants. Judges and magistrates under public pressure pass stiffer sentences. Politicians under pressure pass new laws to deal with the perceived threat. All this tends to convince the public that any fear was justified while the media continue to profit by reporting police and other law enforcement activity.
The theory does not contend that moral panics always include the deviancy amplification spiral. In modern times, media involvement is usual in any moral panic.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
(Redirected from Deviancy Amplification Spiral)
Jump to: navigation, search
Deviancy amplification spiral is a media hype phenomenon defined by media critics as an increasing cycle of reporting on a category of antisocial behavior or other undesirable events. In 1972, Stanley Cohen wrote a book, Folk Devils and Moral Panics, whose thesis is that moral panics usually include what he called a deviancy amplification spiral.
According to theory, the spiral starts with some "deviant" act. Usually the deviance is criminal but it can also involve legal acts considered morally repugnant. The mass media report what they consider to be newsworthy, but the new focus on the issue uncovers hidden or borderline examples which themselves would not have been newsworthy except inasmuch as they confirm the "pattern". For a variety of reasons, what is not frightening and would help the public keep a rational perspective (such as statistics showing that the behavior or event is actually less common or harmful than generally believed) tends to be ignored.
As a result, minor problems begin to look serious and rare events begin to seem common. Members of the public are motivated to keep informed on these events. The resulting publicity has potential to increase deviant behaviour by glamourising it or making it seem common or acceptable.
In the next stage, supporters of the theory contend, public concern about crime typically forces the police and the whole law enforcement system to focus more resources on dealing with the specific deviancy than it warrants. Judges and magistrates under public pressure pass stiffer sentences. Politicians under pressure pass new laws to deal with the perceived threat. All this tends to convince the public that any fear was justified while the media continue to profit by reporting police and other law enforcement activity.
The theory does not contend that moral panics always include the deviancy amplification spiral. In modern times, media involvement is usual in any moral panic.
Moral panic
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search
A moral panic is a reaction by a group of people based on the false or exaggerated perception that some cultural behavior or group, frequently a minority group or a subculture, is dangerously deviant and poses a menace to society. It has also been more broadly defined as an "episode, condition, person or group of persons" that has in recent times been "defined as a threat to societal values and interests." [1] They are byproducts of controversies that produce arguments and social tension, or aren't easily discussed as some of these moral panics are taboo to many people.
These panics are generally fueled by media coverage of social issues, although semi-spontaneous moral panics do occur. Mass hysteria can be an element in these movements, but moral panic is different from mass hysteria in that a moral panic is specifically framed in terms of morality and is usually expressed as outrage rather than unadulterated fear. Moral panics (as defined by Stanley Cohen) revolve around a perceived threat to a value or norm held by a society normally stimulated by glorification within the mass media or 'folk legend' within societies. Panics have a number of outcomes, the most poignant being the certification to the players within the panic that what they are doing appears to warrant observation by mass media and therefore may push them further into the activities that lead to the original feeling of moral panic.
The influences and behaviors of young people are common themes in many moral panics
Commonly cited examples of moral panics inspired by real or imagined phenomena include:
Bestiality, in Washington USA, in the wake of the 2005 Kenneth Pinyan affair, and in Missouri in the wake of the Jerry Springer Show episode 'I married a horse'.
Communism - see McCarthyism in the 1950s.
Pedophilia, Child sexual abuse - fear of "molesters" makes for sensational news - an ongoing tabloid newspaper campaign in the UK resulted in the (incorrectly) reported assault and persecution of a paediatrician by an angry mob (which had confused the two words) in August 2000 , and in 2005 a man in Manchester, England was killed by knife after being mistakenly accused of child molestation by an insane man in the neighborhood.
Social networking sites, such as MySpace - fear of predators stalking teens.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search
A moral panic is a reaction by a group of people based on the false or exaggerated perception that some cultural behavior or group, frequently a minority group or a subculture, is dangerously deviant and poses a menace to society. It has also been more broadly defined as an "episode, condition, person or group of persons" that has in recent times been "defined as a threat to societal values and interests." [1] They are byproducts of controversies that produce arguments and social tension, or aren't easily discussed as some of these moral panics are taboo to many people.
These panics are generally fueled by media coverage of social issues, although semi-spontaneous moral panics do occur. Mass hysteria can be an element in these movements, but moral panic is different from mass hysteria in that a moral panic is specifically framed in terms of morality and is usually expressed as outrage rather than unadulterated fear. Moral panics (as defined by Stanley Cohen) revolve around a perceived threat to a value or norm held by a society normally stimulated by glorification within the mass media or 'folk legend' within societies. Panics have a number of outcomes, the most poignant being the certification to the players within the panic that what they are doing appears to warrant observation by mass media and therefore may push them further into the activities that lead to the original feeling of moral panic.
The influences and behaviors of young people are common themes in many moral panics
Commonly cited examples of moral panics inspired by real or imagined phenomena include:
Bestiality, in Washington USA, in the wake of the 2005 Kenneth Pinyan affair, and in Missouri in the wake of the Jerry Springer Show episode 'I married a horse'.
Communism - see McCarthyism in the 1950s.
Pedophilia, Child sexual abuse - fear of "molesters" makes for sensational news - an ongoing tabloid newspaper campaign in the UK resulted in the (incorrectly) reported assault and persecution of a paediatrician by an angry mob (which had confused the two words) in August 2000 , and in 2005 a man in Manchester, England was killed by knife after being mistakenly accused of child molestation by an insane man in the neighborhood.
Social networking sites, such as MySpace - fear of predators stalking teens.
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